On perceiving tropes by Spryszak, Przemysław
ISSN 2299-0518  13 
Studia Humana 















  Abstract: 
 
In this short paper I consider Professor Bence Nanay’s suggestion that representationalism can 
be supported by the theory of tropes. I argue that from a philosophical point of view such a 
support is nevertheless not very strong.  
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 Any scholar interested in the philosophy of perception will enjoy reading Professor Bence 
Nanay’s fairly recent article on a supportive link between the theory of tropes and 
representationalism [3]. As far as I am concerned, I like the idea of such a connection very much 
and find Nanay’s constructive approach valuable. I must admit, however, that I am not convinced 
that the alleged link is in fact as supportive as it is thought to be. I hope, therefore, that the reader 
will allow me to briefly comment on this issue and will not find my observations completely off the 
mark. 
On page 10, under the heading “The Particularity of Perception”, the author says: 
 
Contrast the following two scenarios. In the first one, I am looking at a pillow, x, and unbeknownst 
to me, it gets replaced with another, indistinguishable pillow, y. I do not notice that the two pillows 
are different: I have no idea that the first pillow, x, was replaced by the second pillow, y. In the 
second scenario, I am looking at a pillow x all along – it does not get replaced with a different 
pillow. The relationalist points out that the representationalist needs to have a story about how to 
distinguish between these two experiences. 
 
In what follows Professor Nanay argues that if we suppose that our experiences represent, 
inter alia, abstract particulars (tropes), the problem for representationalism regarding the answer to 
that question will virtually cease to exist. Although I will present his point of view below, let me 
first slightly alter the initial thought experiment, that is, place a similar one under the above 
heading. For the sake of clarity, I will present my idea step by step. 
1. Suppose that I perceive a property P of an object X and that this property is a trope, and 
that object X itself is also a particular. Let me assume in addition, that object X is unknown to me 
and that my experience is not enriched by previous experiences, thoughts, etc., and that the only 
property of X my sense-experience represents is P. 
2. I think that is fair to say that in such a case my experience tells me merely that 




3. Let us suppose subsequently, that object X was replaced by a particular object Y by 
destroying and immediately duplicating every part of X, with the exception of that part of X which 
is causally responsible for that object having the property P. One can also assume that I have no 
knowledge about that change and that the new object Y is similar to object X in every respect 
relevant to my previous perception of X, and that my attitude to perception is as before, that is, as in 
1. 
4. I think it is fair to say that the object Y has the property P (even if we agreed that property 
P is a trope), and that when I later perceive object Y, my experience tells me merely that 
"something is P". 
5. Now the question arises: when I perceive object Y at present, does my experience tell me 
wrongly that X is P or rightly that X is P? I do not think the question can be justifiably answered 
either way, even if we maintain that X, Y and P are all particulars and that my sense-experience can 
represent them. My perception is in a way undecided, it does not have one definite object, the 
object, much less a particular one. 
Naturally, I am well aware that Professor Nanay might respond immediately by citing the 
rest of part 4.1 of his initial response regarding the peculiarity of perception and repeating that what 
is at issue here is that 
 
If we accept that the properties we perceptually represent are tropes, then we have an easy answer to 
this question. I attribute the very same tropes to the pillow in the two perceptual experiences. 
Importantly, I attribute the trope of being the very same particular token object as the one I saw a 
moment ago (as object permanence is supposed to be perceptually represented, see Spelke 1990, 
1994), (p. 10), 
 
and that I have missed that important factor, which obviously allows us to conclude that the 
peculiar experience mentioned in 4. would simply tell me (wrongly) that X is P, particularly if there 
were no time gap between the two experiences, as in the case that Professor Nanay considers. Alas, 
I would respond that even if it is an empirical fact that there is a sort of object permanence 
representation of a token object, as Professor Elisabeth Spelke argues, that fact seems to be of little 
philosophical significance [4, 5]. What is still missing, in my opinion, is a proof that such a 
representation is necessarily contained in every experiential representation of any particular. Unless 
we are provided with such a proof, we are entitled to say only (at best) that representationalism is 
somewhat strengthened by a theory of tropes in the case where the standard conditions of our 
sense-perception obtain. 
If the reader does not find my remarks very compelling, I ask him to consider the following 
example, which is a short story about a possible world. Suppose that I am overwhelmingly (and 
rightly) convinced that I live in an unstable or dynamic world where there is probability of 0.5 that 
the particular object I perceive was already perceived by me a moment ago, and of 0.5 that it is 
numerically different, that is, that it was not perceived by me a moment ago and was not replaced 
by the object perceived. Let us assume that in this world I always perceive objects as similar to each 
other, like the pillows in the above example. As a result, when I perceive an object X, my 
experience tells me that that the object is F (where the property F is a trope); one can arguably 
suppose that the trope of "being possible to be the same object as the one perceived before" is also 
represented. If the trope of "being possible to be the same object as the object perceived before" is 
preserved in the unusual (though possible) way outlined in 3-4, then there is no way of 
distinguishing between my experience of one persisting object and of two similar (and successive) 
objects. Accordingly, even if we say that objects (properties included) are indeed particulars and 
accept the general idea of representationalism, nevertheless as philosophers and perhaps on a less 
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